Leibniz's logic

Wolfgang Lenzen

Department of Philosophy
University of Osnabrück, Germany

 

 

The logic of G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) is usually considered as a pivot between traditional syllogistic and modern algebra of sets. Many historiographers believe that although Leibniz intended “to produce a calculus wider than traditional logic [...] he never succeeded in producing a calculus which covered even the whole theory of the syllogism” (Kneale 1962, p. 337). As a matter of fact, however, Leibniz not only discovered a fully axiomatized algebra of concepts (provably equivalent to Boolean algebra of sets), but he also anticipated important principles of contemporary systems of set-theory, quantifier logic, and modal propositional calculi.

Description of the contents of the tutorial:
This tutorial aims at reconstructing the following main components of Leibniz’s logic:

  1. The algebra of concepts, L1, which can be viewed as the »intensional« counterpart of the ordinary (»extensional«) algebra of sets;
  2. The extension of L1 by means of »indefinite concepts« which function as (second order) quantifiers;
  3. A genius mapping of L1 into an algebra of propositions which gives rise to a calculus of strict implication;
  4. The syntax and semantics of alethic and deontic modal logic.

 

 

 

Bibliography:

W. & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1962.

W. Lenzen, Das System der Leibnizschen Logik, Berlin (de Gruyter) 1990.

W. Lenzen, Calculus Universalis – Studien zur Logik von G. W. Leibniz, Paderborn (mentis) 2004.

W. Lenzen, “Leibniz’s Logic”, in D. M. Gabbay & J. Woods (eds), Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 3 (The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege), Amsterdam (Elsevier North Holland) 2004, 1-83.