We use concepts all the time to make sense of reality. The quality of our cognition thereby crucially depends on that of our conceptual schemes and repertoires, so that: the better our concepts are, the better our cognitive activities will be. Conceptual engineering is the fast-moving research field [3,5,6] that means to provide a method to assess, criticize, and improve any of our concepts working as such cognitive devices [4,5,10,13] [see also 18,20], that is: to identify conceptual deficiencies, elaborate ameliorative strategies, and prescribe normative guidelines as to whether and how to use a concept (vs.\ to describe how it works as a matter of fact) [1,4,5,19,20]. The aim of the SUFCE tutorial is to provide a systematic overview of conceptual engineering, to be divided into three sessions:

S1: Research Program The first session of the tutorial will introduce the overall research program of conceptual engineering: its starting point, its main goal and objectives, along with its most pressing challenges [6]. A typology of its main variants will be presented, [e.g. 3,5,17] and the standard objections against them will be critically analyzed, [e.g. 12] [cf. 18,20].

S2 Theoretical Foundations The second session of the tutorial will then consist in laying down the foundations of conceptual engineering by developing the theories of cognition (viz.\ `cognitive engineering') [10,11,15] and concepts [14,16,21] that are needed to effectively implement conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices.

S3: Methodological Framework Finally, the third session of the tutorial will deliver a method of conceptual engineering constructed as a fully recast Carnapian method of explication [1] [cf.~7,8], upgraded with other complementary template procedural methods for re-engineering concepts (namely, that of `conceptual modeling' [13], `levels of abstraction' [9], and `reflective equilibrium' [2]).

Basic knowledge in philosophy language, mind and cognition, as well as interest in meta-philosophical issues are expected. Further material will be available in due course. At least one-quarter of each session will be devoted to discussion (Q\&A).

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